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What a difference a death makes: 







The casual observer of the controversy over policing at April 2009’s G20 
summit in London might have been forgiven for imagining that Britain’s 
media serves as a bulwark against the abuse of power, fearlessly illuminating 
and condemning injustice. The publication of video footage and eye-witness 
accounts to heavy-handed protest policing has certainly raised the profile of 
this issue and led, concretely, to formal investigation of both individual police 
officers and to policing strategies more broadly. In this paper we examine the 
policing of protest, and in particular ‘anti-systemic’ protest, but also examine 
the role of the newspaper media in the interplay between police and protest. 
We argue that the media has often fomented and ignored the very 'abuses' 
they are now so eager to condemn. The key difference between coverage of the 
2009 G20 summit and past such events, we contend, is the tragic death of an 









The initial media perception of the police operation [at the G20 in 
London] was predominantly positive with comment being made about 
the restraint shown by the officers involved. Following the death of 
Ian Tomlinson, however, the focus changed.  
(Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 2009: 65) 
 
Controversy surrounding the policing of the G20 Summit in April 2009 led to 
intense scrutiny of public order policing tactics, to criminal charges being 
considered against individual junior officers, and to several formal inquiries. 
To the casual observer the London G20 may have seemed to reveal Britain’s 
(or at least London’s) police as, at best, undisciplined and overly aggressive 
and, at worst, wantonly contemptuous of ordinary people. To the same 
observer the role of Britain’s media in revealing police indiscipline and in 
holding the authorities to account might have offered an exemplar of the 
fourth estate in action. However, and as we will argue, what differentiated 
policing at the G20 from numerous prior protests was not so much what 
happened on the day, not so much the tactics or the behaviour of the police, as 
the reaction and aftermath to the death of an innocent bystander. It was the 
newsworthiness of an entirely avoidable fatality that focussed media attention 
on long-standing tactics of protest policing – mass detention in ‘corrals’, the 
removal of police identification numbers, and an aggressive stance towards 
anyone caught up ‘in the protest zone’. As we shall argue here, culpability for 
police tactics and for their consequences lie, at least in part, with the self-same 
media who so convincingly damned them after the event. 
 
In 2005 the UK hosted an important international summit, the G8, which 
brought together the world’s most powerful leaders, and which was the focus 
of mass protest. Security was high and, as police officers were drafted in from 
across the UK, a capital city braced itself for unprecedented protests. The 
diverse strands of the global justice movement were represented in a 
succession of radically different marches, rallies, conferences and forms of 
protest. These ranged from a massive Edinburgh demonstration by the Make 
Poverty History coalition, to attempts to breach the perimeter fence around 
the Gleneagles Hotel, to aggressive stand-offs between police and protestors. 
As the dust settled, the police celebrated a successful operation and were 
applauded by the news media. Others, however, contested this version of 
events and condemned police tactics. On sites like Indymedia police were said 
to have dispensed with identification numbers; to have corralled protestors 
and bystanders for several hours without water or toilets (a controversial 
tactic known as ‘kettling’); made arrests and collected personal details and 
fingerprints apparently without adequate reason; and to have acted 
aggressively towards both protestors and passers-by. All of these types of 
instance were witnessed, independently, by both current authors. Photos 
showed police shoving onlookers with shields and raising batons against 
protestors. Mainstream media were, by and large, entirely uninterested in 
such concerns. 
 
Fast forward four years and the UK again hosted an international summit in a 
capital city. Police were drafted in and protests anticipated. Once again a 
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mainstream, set-piece march passed off uneventfully in the prelude to 
demonstrations with more radical demands. On 1 April 2009, as world leaders 
gathered for the G20 summit, a man caught up amidst protesters and police in 
central London collapsed and, having received emergency attention, died en 
route to hospital. Police and protestors traded charges about their responses – 
the police tactic of ‘kettling’ or containing people within a given area was 
condemned by activists who in turn were accused of throwing objects at police 
medics attending the dying man. Beyond these recriminations, there initially 
seemed to be nothing untoward about this tragic loss of life which was rapidly 
attributed to ‘natural causes’. 
 
There the matter may, and probably would, have ended but for the 
intervention of numerous activists, passers-by and onlookers who came 
forward to state that the man in question had been in an altercation with the 
police shortly before collapsing. Over the following days and weeks an 
increasing number of accounts emerged that painted a very different picture 
of events. As details came to light, the way in which protest policing was 
reported began to shift to a point where several inquiries into police action 
were launched and the Sunday Times suggested that ‘parts of the 
Metropolitan police were out of control during the protests’ (Gourlay & 
Leppard 2009). In early July, the report of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary called for a national overhaul of protest policing and questioned 
the British police’s ability to manage an event like the Olympics (Booth 2009). 
 
Our focus in this paper is one of the key contexts within which political 
demonstrations occur. Such contexts include the particular location and its 
prior history of protest and/or public order; the political situation with 
regards to political rights, political dissent and policing; the specific history 
between particular police forces and particular kinds of protestor. Each of 
these was, of course, crucial to the way in which both protestors and police 
prepared for and acted on the days of demonstration around the G20. Our 
focus here, however, is a broader context: mass media coverage prior to the 
demonstrations, specifically within ‘mainstream’ newspapers.  
 
The shock and outrage characterising newspaper articles in the aftermath of 
the G20 suggested that ‘police brutality’ is always unacceptable and 
inexplicable. However, it was not the policing that differentiated the G20 in 
2009 from past events so much as the tragic outcome of police tactics and 
media interpretation of them. Indeed, up till the 2 or 3 April, the G20 offered 
a mirror image of previous international summits held in the UK (such as that 
in Gleneagles, 2005) in terms of both coverage and policing. The death of Ian 
Tomlinson (a 47 year old newspaper vendor) prompted a range of inquiries 
into police actions, but there has been less analysis of the role of the press. 
This paper argues that sensationalised predictions and coverage of protest 
events should also be subjected to critical scrutiny. We address the literature 
on policing, protest and media and draw on a close analysis of coverage 
leading up to and succeeding the G20 to argue that the press play a key role in 
police/protestor relations. We conclude that protest events need to be 




Protest, Policing and the Press 
 
Over the past few decades in Western democracies there has arguably been a 
move towards less confrontational protest policing (Della Porta & Reiter 1998, 
Gillham & Marx 2000, Waddington & King 2005). In Britain this trend dates 
back to the Scarman Report which concluded that the 1981 Brixton riot was 
partly a reaction to aggressive policing, and advocated a new code of conduct. 
Similar processes elsewhere fostered demands for more accountability and fed 
into dialogue-based approaches to protest policing such as ‘negotiated 
management’ (Della Porta & Reiter 1998, Vitale 2005). Negotiated 
management emphasises the need for cooperation and communication 
between police and protestors and aims to pre-empt violence by removing 
cues and actions that could inflame sensitive situations. The approach is 
premised on a constructive relationship between police and demonstrators 
and emphasises the right to protest. Negotiated solutions include the 
facilitation of protests and a toleration of disruption to public life. 
 
Negotiated management as a police philosophy is an attempt to maintain 
public order whilst retaining legitimacy and democratic freedoms (Della Porta 
& Fillieule 2004, Vitale 2005). It also reflects research showing that repressive 
policing is often counter-productive (Earl 2003, Reicher et al 2004). As 
Gillham & Marx (2000: 212) note, however, there are multiple factors - 
including training and attitudes, the legal context and media presence - which 
shape the policing of any particular protest event. Negotiated management, 
thus, may not be applied in every context – D. Waddington (2007: 16) notes 
how the desire to avoid direct confrontation has spawned a range of 
‘preventative measures, of varying degrees of overtness and legality’ - and may 
not work if it is applied.  
 
Given the various factors that come into play when a protest coincides with 
international summits, Ericson & Doyle insist that ‘the policing of protest at 
international events must be understood and researched as a distinctive 
category’ (1999: 605). Such events, they note, heighten security concerns and 
government intervention. P. Waddington’s (2003: 411) distinction between 
‘on the job trouble’ (referring to police deployment) and ‘in the job trouble’ 
(referring to the political fallout from contentious operations) is useful here. 
Fear of the latter can harden police attitudes and impose greater restrictions 
on protest constituencies. From this perspective one would expect 
international summits to be characterised by greater tension between 
protestors and police, but this is not uniformly the case. In both 2005 and 
2009 certain marches during the course of an international summit offered 
text-book exemplars of the negotiated management approach. In 2005, the 
Make Poverty History march – the largest demonstration ever seen in 
Scotland – passed off without a single protest related arrest. Likewise the rally 
by Church groups, Trades Unions and NGOs called Put People First in March 
2009 passed off without incident and was fully facilitated by the police. 1 
 
Clearly there is a need for more nuanced analysis of ‘summit policing’.  
Indeed, King & Waddington (2005) and Sheptycki (2005) have applied the 
‘flashpoints model’ to examples of global protest, and argue that a number of 
key variables affect the outcome of such events. D. Waddington et al’s (1989: 
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22) ‘flashpoints model’ reinforces the necessity of examining the wider context 
within which public disorder occurs and is framed. The model conceives of six 
inter-related ‘levels of structuration’ – structural, political/ideological, 
cultural, contextual, situational and interactional. It distinguishes between 
‘antecedent conditions (the ‘tinder’)’ and specific and situated ‘interpersonal 
interaction (the ‘spark’)’ (ibid.  2). The model helps to explain why a volatile 
situation ignites (or not) depending on localised interaction which is mediated 
through the broader levels. The model has been critiqued on a number of 
counts (see King & Waddington 2005 for an overview) and there is a need to 
recognise that there may be multiple ‘flashpoints’. 
 
Media coverage is factored into the ‘contextual’ level and affects actors’ 
‘calculations of trouble’ (D. Waddington 2007: 21). This process is, however, 
rather underspecified. In this paper we illustrate how newspaper coverage 
intersects with protest policing, and contributes to what Della Porta & Fillieule 
(2004) term ‘police knowledge’. They argue that the police generate 
stereotypes and short-hands which frame their understanding of who they are 
confronting and note that these forms of knowledge are a key variable in the 
policing of protest. Gorringe & Rosie’s (2008) research on protest policing at 
the 2005 G8 summit echoes these findings and notes how police perceptions 
of differing groups (their legitimacy, objectives and tactics) has a significant 
bearing on how a protest event is policed. These perceptions are shaped in 
part by the history of interactions between specific protestors and police and 
by the willingness (or otherwise) of protestors to engage with the law 
enforcement authorities. These perceptions are generated in the context of an 
increase in police powers (both conventional and anti-terrorism) and heated 
debates about the erosion of civil liberties (Moran 2007). Moran (ibid: 409) 
highlights the potential dangers of these powers in noting how the term 
‘terrorism’ has been extended to apply to ‘violent industrial disputes and 
animal rights protestors’. This is clearly an important contextual factor for 
understanding the policing strategies deployed in London in 2009, but our 
focus is on how such techniques are legitimised for use against political 
protestors. We contend that it is not international summits that are policed 
differently (since different protesters are treated differently) so much as anti-
systemic or anarchist protests who have been turned into contemporary folk-
devils. 
 
Earl & Soule (2006) point to the police’s fear of ‘losing control’ as contributing 
to repressive policing. P. Waddington (1993), consequently, advocates 
paramilitary style policing with clear lines of command and control to ensure 
professionalism and discipline. Jefferson (1990), by contrast, insists that 
paramilitary methods can exacerbate violence. The case for paramilitary 
policing assumes that officers get carried away in the heat of the moment, but 
it is clear that apprehension about particular groups may predate and help 
shape police strategies. The antecedents of these preconceptions, thus, are 
critical. Police training, briefings and understandings of crowd psychology 
deserve scrutiny (cf. Reicher 2009) and were considered in the media furore 
surrounding the G20. Little space though was accorded to media’s role in 
shaping protest events. The way in which an event is framed, however, has 
significant ramifications:  
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Framing refers to the deliberate or unintentional deployment of 
specific properties of a news narrative which encourages people 
perceiving and thinking about events to develop particular 
understandings of them (McFarlane & Hay 2003:217) 
 
By reference to public order policing, Juris argues that ‘the mass media tend 
to construct militant protest in particular as dangerous and criminal’ (2005: 
423). Rosie & Gorringe (2009: 42) likewise note that ‘“Genoa” and “anarchist” 
have become media short-hands invoking a “dangerous” folk devil’. The 
media, of course, is clearly not monolithic and, following Murdock (1973: 158), 
we are not suggesting a deliberate ‘conspiracy’ to discredit protestors or 
defend police authorities. Media coverage, however, helps construct social 
meanings ‘by associating certain words with certain problems and issues’ 
(Althiede 2006: 419). It is clear that particular certain frames and media 
short-hands predominate and that coverage of protest events tends to be 
‘episodic’ – focusing on ‘newsworthy’ and often sensationalised stories and 
images – rather than thematic (Smith et al 2001).  
 
The impact of such coverage is open to debate. There is some suggestion that 
the presence of reporters (especially TV crews) can result in more consensual 
policing (Doyle 2003: 11). The significance accorded to television coverage 
reflects the sense that the police may influence news production (ibid 28), but 
cannot control live coverage or people’s interpretation of it. An appreciation of 
this has helped fuel the rise of an activist media (cf. De Jong et al, 2005) which 
were to the fore in the events of 1 April 2009. Several studies address similar 
questions relating to news coverage of events (Murdock 1973, Smith et al 
2001), but few reflect upon the mediated context within which protest occurs. 
Of interest here is the extent to which the media exaggerates or dispels fears in 
the days and months preceding any event. 
 
We contend that the analysis of media context is essential to a full 
understanding of any given protest. As one officer pithily noted with regard t0 
sensationalised coverage prior to the 2005 G8 demonstrations: ‘Cops read 
papers too’ (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008:699). Given the significance of police 
knowledge and anticipation of trouble to protest policing, anticipatory 
coverage is, if anything, more important than how an event itself is reported. 
Reicher et al (2004) highlight the dangers of treating crowds and crowd 
members as homogeneous and problematic, but media forecasts of violence 
can reinforce such tendencies. In terms of the flashpoints model, we would 
argue that more attention should be given to this crucial ‘level of 
structuration’. The media context, furthermore, potentially shapes both public 
opinion (Weakliem 2003) and the protest event as well. There is a danger that 
sensationalised stories can become self-fulfilling: they can reinforce the 
residual attachment to discredited understandings of the ‘madding crowd’ (cf. 
Schweingruber 2000) meaning that police forces view protestors as liable to 
turn into a mob. Such understandings correlate with more aggressive and 
heavy-handed police responses. Secondly, they can alter the make up of a 
protest constituency – deterring those who wish to make their views heard but 
are wary of violence – and reinforce its sense of coherence and oppositional 
identity (Reicher et al 2004). 
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The mediated context is important for another reason. A series of recent 
studies portray mass media as the arena in which the politics of dissent are 
played out, and increasingly argue that contemporary news media offer 
opportunities for activists to get their points across (De Jong et al 2005, Juris 
2005). Cottle (2008: 853) argues that ‘protests and demonstrations today 
have become reflexively conditioned by their pursuit of media attention’. 
Whilst this is true of most protestors, there is a parallel trend for radical 
activists to create their own media outlets and means of communication 
(CounterSpin Collective 2005). The events of April 2009 are interesting in 
large part because of the intersection between these two media and the forms 
of activism that the creation of an activist media has created. Rather than 
Doyle’s (2003) focus on the ‘calming’ influence of television, we contend that 
the ubiquitous presence of digital recorders and camera ‘phones transformed 
the interpretation of this event.  
 
 
The gathering storm … 
 
In what follows we offer an analysis of newspaper coverage preceding, during 
and shortly after the G20 summit in April 2009. We used the LexisNexis2 
newspaper database to search articles within 149 UK-based newspapers. We 
searched for all articles containing the terms ‘G20’, ‘policing’, ‘anarchist’ or 
‘protest’ between January and April 2009. In selecting articles our intention 
was to illustrate prevalent patterns in the mainstream press. The aim is to 
highlight the volte face in reporting that followed Tomlinson’s death and to 
critically analyse the role of the media rather than to offer a comprehensive 
account of all coverage. This may mean that we sometimes neglect the (all too 
rare) insights of thoughtful commentators but we contend that the articles 
analysed below offers a fair reflection of the overarching tone of newspaper 
coverage. 
 
Our prior research has noted the tendency of many reports – and not simply 
within ‘sensationalist’ tabloids – to frame a wide range of upcoming protests 
in terms of dangerous ‘anarchists’. Even the most respectable of protest 
organisations are reported within this frame, in that they may (unwittingly ) 
provide cover for ‘illegitimate’ protest activities. This ubiquity of this trope led 
us to conclude that:  
 
The [dangerous ‘anarchist’] folk devil, clearly, is well established. The 
efficacy of the short-hand is such that sensationalist stories - so long as 
they conform to and confirm established stereotypes - can be 
constructed on the thinnest of evidence. An incessant association of 
‘anarchism’ with violence facilitates moral panic about ‘illegitimate’, 
‘unauthorised’ and ‘unjustified’ forms of political action.  
(Rosie & Gorringe, 2009:47) 
 
Identical media habits were all too evident prior to London’s G20 protests. In 
late March 2009 the Times headlined that London “prepares for summit 
street battle; Hundreds of anti-capitalists plan to besiege bank”: 
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Scotland Yard issued a stark warning of violent disorder in the City of 
London on the eve of the G20 summit, with the police stretched to their 
limit in the middle of an extraordinary week of public protest. 
Anarchists, environmentalists and anti-globalisation groups are 
collaborating to mount an "unprecedented" sequence of 
demonstrations across London and police chiefs fear that they will be 
playing cat and mouse with militants.  (O’Neill, 2009) 
The following day the Observer noted that London office workers “face chaos 
next week with swaths of London in security lockdown”: 
Details of direct action, gleaned from chatter on anarchist websites and 
meetings attended by the Observer, include a rumoured plan to block 
the Blackwall Tunnel and cause a security scare on the London 
Underground by leaving bags unattended on trains. There is also 
speculation that protesters will drive a tank to the ExCeL conference 
centre in London's Docklands, where the G20 are meeting, and attempt 
to harass politicians with wake-up calls to their hotels in the middle of 
the night. None of the organisers of the peaceful demonstrations say 
they are aware of any such tactics.  (Smith & Rogers, 2009) 
In addition to such ‘details’ – which attentive readers may have noted derived 
from ‘chatter’, ‘rumour’ and ‘speculation’ – the report noted “growing fears for 
the safety of people going to work”; worries that public transport would be 
“paralysed”; and that businesses expected “losses worth millions”. Lest all this 
should be seen as merely speculative, the Observer quoted a source from 
within a “leading protest group”: 
Anti-capitalist groups believe the recession and spiralling 
unemployment will encourage an uprising not seen since the poll tax 
riots, causing embarrassment to Gordon Brown as he hosts world 
leaders. Chris Knight, of the leading protest group Government of the 
Dead, warned: "The revolution is coming. This is our time, and I 
honestly believe that the army, the police, will be so intent on keeping 
the ExCeL centre they will lose the City of London."  (Smith & Rogers, 
2009) 
Almost as an afterthought the article concluded:  
On Saturday, Put People First, a campaign group involving the TUC 
and 120 other organisations, will hold a separate march and rally in 
Hyde Park calling on G20 world leaders to ensure decent jobs and 
public services for all. (Smith & Rogers, 2009) 
Our point here is not so much that the ‘anarchist’ frame is utilised by even 
‘serious’ newspapers – after all, like its rivals the Observer has to shift units – 
but that this frame comes to dominate protest related news. It may seem 
surprising that the Observer declares Government of the Dead as a “leading 
protest group” whilst largely ignoring Put People First (a broad coalition of 
trade unions, faith groups, NGOs and charities) but ‘anarchists’ make better 
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copy than trade unionists. The other issue to note is the scattergun approach 
to prospective anarchist ‘outrages’ without any careful assessment of which 
are actually likely to transpire. After all, the Bank of England was surrounded 
by activists (though hardly besieged) and a branch of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland was broken into. However, the press habit lies in listing a multitude 
of possible actions – thus making headlines - rather than investigating and 
reporting ‘hard news’. 
We can illustrate this more clearly through the coverage in the Sunday Times 
(the UK’s highest selling Sunday ‘quality’ newspaper) the day after 35,000 
marched, entirely peaceably, in support of Put People First.  The march 
received almost no coverage: a short (300 word) piece dismissed marchers as 
aiming to pin “anything they could blame on Gordon Brown” (Woods, 2009). 
Rather more space was given to upcoming protests. An article headlined “G20 
protestors face police with Tasers” (and rather more grotesquely in the first 
edition as “Police to use stun guns on G20 protesters”) focussed upon “violent 
demonstrators planning to disrupt this week’s G20 summit”. The decision to 
issue police with Tasers is neither problematised nor questioned and the 
sympathies of the article are perhaps seen in the link to Daniel Finkelstein’s 
blog inviting those ‘annoyed about the G20 riots [sic] to have a rant about it 
here’.3 The article concluded: “The organisers of the protests - an alliance of 
environmental campaigners, anticapitalist and religious groups - insist they 
will be peaceful. However, police fear that anarchist elements are likely to stir 
up trouble.”  (Leppard & Swinford, 1999). The ‘paper then describes nine 
protest groups under the sub heading “Who’s Protesting”. The list was ordered 
not in terms of size or influence, but in terms of their ‘dangerous’ exoticism: 
London Anarchists; Whitechapel Anarchists; and the ‘veteran anarchists’ of 
Class War were listed first. Bottom of the list were the rather larger, but less 
copy-friendly, People and Planet’; the Stop the War Coalition; and CND 
(Leppard & Swinford, 1999). 
On the same day the Sunday Mirror, under the headline “Anarchy back in the 
UK” reproduced police briefings that anarchist veterans “from the 1990 Poll 
Tax riots” and “Rent-a-mob hooligans from the 2001 May Day riots” were 
“coming out of retirement to plot mayhem” and “wreak carnage” (Penrose, 
2009). Again the main organisations involved in planning the protests – not 
to mention their arguments and proposed policies – were entirely ignored in 
favour of a focus on the ‘extreme’. Our decision to counterpose the 2005 G8 
Summit to the 2009 G20 in the introduction is a deliberate inversion of the 
common strategy to ‘locate’ protest by reference to ‘notorious’ events in the 
past. Though Gleneagles was a more recent exemplar the headlines here hark 
back to 1990 or 2001. Should the paper have wanted a London specific 
example, though, the 2003 Stop the War demonstration (one of the largest 
ever seen in Britain) would have sufficed … but for the absence of violence. 
A media tendency to prioritise ‘sensational’ and violent themes, to report 
rumour and ‘anticipated disorder’ rather than to report actual (and often 
disappointingly peaceful) events is well documented (Donson et al 2004; Juris 
2005; Murdock 1973; Rosie & Gorringe 2009). From this perspective, press 
habits prior to the G20 are entirely in line with what we might have expected. 
They highlighted themes of conspiratorial, secretive and dangerous protestors 
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and a concomitant para-militarization of the policing. Lost in the coverage, 
were ‘legitimate’ and ‘peaceful’ protest organisations, their motivations and 
policies. Their role, if they are assigned one, is as naïve dupes of the folk devil. 
In much coverage this is merely implicit, but in some it is headline news: 
“Anarchists planning to storm City banks: They will masquerade as peaceful 
demonstrators’ (Dominiczak & Lefley, 2009 – emphases added. The same 
claim is made by Edwards & Gammell, 2009). 
Our focus on such coverage is intended not just as an illustration of dominant 
media frames, but as a reflection on the environment within which protest 
occurs. One must feel some sympathy for front-line officers, nervous at what 
will face them in protest situations, and ‘reminded’ that the anarchist enemy 
need not look like an anarchist, but like a peaceful protestor, a curious 
onlooker, or an innocent bystander. These constructions shape the context 
within which the policing of protest occurs both by reinforcing the image of a 
folk-devil and by legitimating forceful policing.  
The morning after the night before 
If media tropes prior to the G20 summit were predictable, so too were those in 
the first few days of protest and in their immediate aftermath. On the morning 
of 1 April the Daily Telegraph warned that London faced “two days of chaos 
and disruption” (Edwards & Gammell, 2009). The Times noted that police 
were called to “man [the] barricades” in “Fortress London”, whilst the 
Scotsman claimed that the city faced its “biggest security operation since 
WW2” (Webster & Baldwin, 2009; Peev, 2009). Later the Evening Standard 
reported that “Violence sweeps City …” with protestors unleashing “Bank 
rage” (Davenport & Randhawa, 2009a, 2009b). A branch of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland was broken into, but footage of the incident belies the predictions of 
secretive anarchists leading forays from within a peaceful crowd. Rather, we 
see a large group of onlookers, a disproportionate number of whom have 
cameras, gathered round as others openly smash their way in. The restraint of 
the majority of protestors is seen in that only four people were charged in this 
case.4 Later it emerged that one man had died during the day, although the 
BBC noted only that he “died after collapsing, police said”5.  
Few reports on 2 April hinted at controversy over the death, focussing instead 
on protest violence and the behaviour of protestors. Late on 1 April a 
Metropolitan Police press release noted that “officers took the decision to 
move [the fatally injured man] as during this time a number of missiles - 
believed to be bottles - were being thrown at them”6. Many newspapers ran 
with the story of officers tending to a stricken man being “… pelted with 
bottles and forced to retreat” (Edwards et al, 2009); “As police officers tried in 
vain to revive the man they were pelted with bottles by a screaming mob” 
(Turnbull & Gregory, 2009). As Doyle (2003) found, police briefings carry 
authority and are often accepted without corroboration. 
Early reports, in other words, are fully in line with the dominant frame as 
noted in the HPIC quote at the head of this paper. Nothing in the actions of 
police or protesters was sufficient to challenge the accepted wisdom at this 
stage and the coverage’s over-riding motif was violence. The Daily Mail led 
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with “Bloodshed as mobs turn on the police” noting that “masked anarchists” 
had sought to “hijack protests”. Despite this sensational headline, the Mail 
conceded that the demonstrations were considerably smaller than anticipated, 
with protestors heavily outnumbered by police. Nevertheless, the Mail 
projected fears further into the Summit week: 
Senior police said last night that they feared yesterday's protests were a 
'dry run' for further disturbances, noting that 'riot generals' had been 
seen orchestrating violence … Among the crowds yesterday were groups 
… in what police called the 'uniform of anarchists' dark top, trousers 
and boots with hat and mask. Larger demonstrations are planned today 
and tomorrow … (Williams et al, 2009) 
Violence, when it fails to materialise as predicted, can thus simply be shifted 
forward in time, with the added spice that disorder already witnessed can be 
‘spun’ into a ‘dry run’ orchestrated by sinister ‘riot generals’.  
There are two things to note about the Mail’s coverage. First, it illustrates the 
flexibility of an ‘anarchist’ folk devil that is simultaneously dangerously 
invisible (in that anarchists can so easily ‘masquerade’ as peaceful protestors) 
and all too visible. Thus the ‘obvious’ and ‘uniformed’ anarchists dominating 
the photographs and video clips accompanying protest reportage serve, 
ironically, to underpin the wider ‘truth’ of dangerous, secretive, invisible 
anarchists7. Second is the related figure of the ‘riot general’ whose existence 
intimates sinister and well-organised groups. This is illustrated by a ‘special 
investigation’ carried by the Mail on 2 April. Journalist Arthur Martin 
revealed how he had gone “Undercover with the anarchist mob”, to find 
himself on 1 April: 
Penned in among a fearsome group of thugs outside the Bank of 
England, dressed head to toe in black, I was one of the mob. Our faces 
covered with scarves and balaclavas, we were part of a surging wave of 
violence. Glass bottles, bricks and chairs went flying through the air. 
Martin spent a month in “anarchist attire – black hoodie, dark scruffy jeans 
and trainers” - infiltrating the “secretive discussions” of “hate-filled anarchists 
… angry men … [a] bizarre group of misfits”. At these “war summits” 
assembled anarchists were given their “latest orders” from “a 66-year old 
anthropology lecturer … content to pull strings behind the scenes and let 
others do his dirty work” (Martin, 2009). 8  
This lurid picture is laden with contradiction. The motley bunch are presented 
as “misfits”, without ideological purpose or sophistication, simply out for a 
‘ruck’. Yet can these be the same ‘misfits’ who so expertly – and secretively – 
serve to undermine legitimate protest and the fabric of capitalism? The 
answer was found in the pages of the Telegraph on 2 April: 
Fears of organised riots, which had led to the deployment of 5,000 
police officers, proved unfounded as the vast majority of demonstrators 
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refused to be lead by a small cadre of around 40 anarchists intent on 
stirring up trouble. (Edwards et al, 2009) 
 
What a difference a death makes … 
By 3 April, two days after the ‘Fools Day’ disturbances, there was a noticeable 
shift in the tone of some coverage. This was most marked in the Guardian, 
which gave over considerable space to police tactics’: 
Outside the Bank of England [on 1 April], thousands were held for up to 
eight hours behind a police cordon, in a practice known as ‘kettling’. 
Parents with children and passers-by were told by officers on the 
cordon that ‘no one could leave’. According to witnesses, when they 
were finally allowed to go on Wednesday night, they were ordered to 
provide names and addresses and have their pictures taken. If they 
refused, they were sent back behind the cordon. (Laville & Duncan, 
2009) 
 
A feature essay in the same edition was exceptionally critical of ‘kettling’: 
 
… why were the crowd given no instructions as to where they should go 
or when? The area became a public lavatory … The containment was 
backed up at the Bank of England, first with mounted police and then 
with police dogs, ramping up tensions and fuelling further bloody 
confrontations.  (Campbell 2009)  
 
 
The Times carried a highly critical account from one of their own journalists 
who had endured “seven hours of detention without food or water” within the 
kettle: 
 
The police tactics were simple. At the first hint of trouble, they enacted 
a long-planned strategy – trapping and detaining all the protestors, 
violent or not … Once established the cordon slowly squeezed – each 
police charge rolling past any protestors who refused to move, battering 
them. No one was released. If I were to design a system to provoke and 
alienate, I could not do better”. (Whipple 2009) 
 
The journalist argued that police tactics contributed significantly to “the story 
of how a largely peaceful protest … eventually turned violent”: “Just as the 
people who attacked the officers were idiots, so the actions of the police made 
that violence inevitable” (Whipple 2009). 
 
Within a day or so, therefore, the mood within some newspapers (and not only 
those on the liberal-left) had shifted substantially from a focus on 
(anticipated) protestor violence and towards police tactics. Two contributory 
factors are the experiences of journalists within the ‘kettles’ and the 
willingness of activists to air their concerns through the media (cf. Cottle 
2008). Neither of these, we contend, is unprecedented or capable of shifting 
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the media gaze so comprehensively. The key issue was undoubtedly the death 
of Ian Tomlinson; protest-related deaths (or indeed serious injuries) are 
mercifully rare in Britain. That the death had shifted the goalposts was made 
explicitly clear by the Guardian, whose main feature began with reference to 
the 1979 death of anti-fascist Blair Peach at the hands of an unidentified 
Metropolitan Police officer: 
 
Another 30 years, another demonstration, another death, albeit one 
that appears to have no link at all to violence by either police or 
demonstrators. Once again, however, the policing of the protest is 
under scrutiny. (Campbell 2009) 
 
Notably, the shift in tone occurred when Tomlinson’s death was still seen as 
accidental. The Metropolitan Police’s response to this scrutiny and the 
emerging criticisms over ‘kettling’ is illuminating. Commander Simon O’Brien 
insisted that the tactic had been employed only in response to violence, and 
that peaceful protestors and passers-by thus corralled were free to leave: 
 
There was no real deliberate attempt to say ‘you are all going to stay 
here for hours’ … What I saw ... at that time [towards the end of several 
hours of ‘kettling’] was a couple of hundred people who did not want to 
go. They had been the agitators throughout the day. (quoted in Laville 
& Duncan, 2009) 
 
We were attempting to keep certain groups and individuals apart. 
Those who wanted to leave could, and those who wanted to stay and 
make their point, we facilitated that. (quoted in Davenport 2009) 
 
As the Guardian drily noted, their journalists “saw and spoke to many people 
who were clearly not agitators, but who were refused permission to leave” 
(Laville & Duncan, 2009) 9. If O’Brien’s position - that kettling facilitated 
protest - read clumsily on 3 April, it was to seem utterly outlandish as the 
police version of events unravelled.  
 
Over the next week a number of complaints about police violence emerged, 
accompanied by allegations that there had been at least one – and perhaps 
several – altercations between Ian Tomlinson and police officers prior to his 
death. On Tuesday 7 April the Guardian published video footage which 
showed Tomlinson walking away from officers with his hands in his pockets. 
An officer strikes him behind the knees with his baton, and then violently 
shoves Tomlinson in the back sending him sprawling. None of the 
surrounding officers assist him to his feet or reprimand their colleague.10 
Several moments later, Tomlinson collapsed. A second post-mortem 
suggested that the cause of death was not a heart attack, but internal bleeding. 
Police claims of officers being attacked by protestors as they sought to 
resuscitate Tomlinson were flatly contradicted by video evidence. 
 
If the very fact of a protest-related death was sufficient to spark a change of 
media tone, the emerging evidence ensured that police tactics were subjected 
to intensely critical scrutiny. It became clear that Tomlinson had died shortly 
after being assaulted by a police officer. Senior police officers, far from 
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curtailing ‘disorganised forays by individual police officers’ (P. Waddington 
1993:  366), had at best obfuscated the circumstances, and at worst had 
deliberately sought to mislead. Compellingly, Tomlinson was very much a 
‘passer-by’, innocently caught up in the police ‘kettle’. Trying to get home, 
following his usual route from work, Tomlinson found himself trapped within 
lines of riot-clad police officers. It would seem that his attempts to leave – 
notwithstanding Commander O’Brien’s claim that people were ‘free to leave’ – 
were repeatedly blocked by a police operation which, by accident or design, 
treated all within the cordon as ‘suspect’. As the chairman of the Metropolitan 
Police Federation told BBC Radio 4: 
 
On a day like that, where there are some protesters who are quite 
clearly hell-bent on causing as much trouble as they can, there is 
inevitably going to be some physical confrontation. Sometimes it isn't 
clear, as a police officer, who is a protester and who is not. I know it's a 
generalisation but anybody in that part of the town at that time, the 
assumption would be that they are part of the protest. I accept that's 
perhaps not a clever assumption but it's a natural one. 11 
 
Implicit and unquestioned in this statement is the suggestion that the actions 
of the police would have been justified had Tomlinson been a protestor. 
Encapsulated in this quote, as Reicher (2009) notes, is the belief that anyone 
in the area is a troublemaker – either because ‘decent’ people would have left 
or because they are susceptible to the psychology of the crowd. In the weeks 
and months since the G20, the press have built up a picture of other instances 
where police have acted with violent aggression and seen protestors as ‘fair 
game’.12 The attention directed towards police tactics and attitudes is both 
welcome and overdue, and police briefings and training must be reconsidered. 
Mostly absent from these debates, however, is any introspection or analysis of 
the role of the press (but see Porter 2009). We contend that this critical 
analysis of policing is overdue in part because similar tactics, actions and 
assumptions have been overlooked, forgiven or even encouraged by the media 
in the past. As Marx noted in response to the U.S. urban riots of the 1960s:  
‘Knowledge that they are unlikely to be subjected to post-riot sanctioning may 





The fallout from the G20 has cast a spotlight onto public order policing that 
promises to change the way protest events are approached. Even the internal 
report by HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, which praises the ‘considerable 
collective achievement by the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service]’ (HMIC 
2009: 39) has been critical of aspects of the police operation. The report 
highlights the oft neglected requirement for MPS officers to wear 
identification numbers (p57), and the need to communicate better (or indeed 
at all) with those caught up in ‘kettles’ (p54). Overall, the report details the 
difficulties of contemporary protest policing but stresses the need to facilitate 
‘peaceful protest throughout the planning process and execution of the 
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operation’ (p47). For all the emphasis on ‘adapting to protest’ and updating 
police tactics and procedures, the report has little to suggest by way of 
innovation. Indeed the recommendations on kettling (p54) echo those made 
before and ignored. 
 
Of particular concern to us here, furthermore, is the focus on the facilitation of 
‘peaceful protest’. This terminology is problematic on two related counts: 
firstly it gives police officers the discretion to determine who is and is not a 
‘peaceful protestor’. As we have shown elsewhere (Gorringe & Rosie 2008) the 
police have a preconceived idea of which kind of protestor, and which kind of 
causes, are legitimate. The second danger, as we have demonstrated above, is 
that all protestors can be (and often are) presented as potentially violent.13 
The report paves the way for ‘business-as-usual’ in the policing of ‘anarchists’ 
or similar folk-devils. Whilst we hope that the various reports into the G20, 
and the charges brought against one officer for assault14 prompt a rethink of 
the policing tactics and approaches to protest, we would argue that this needs 
to include an alteration in attitudes towards anti-systemic protestors too. This 
point brings the media back into the picture. 
 
The HMIC report emphasises the importance of communication about and 
during protest events between police, protestors and the public. This is hardly 
a new idea (Jefferson 1990, Reicher et al 2004, Gorringe & Rosie 2008). One 
reason why it has taken the G20 to bring this to the fore is that a primary 
channel of communication between the three parties – the mass media – has 
contributed to stoking up fears. Better communication alone will achieve little 
whist there is a residual attachment to notions of the madding crowd. The 
perception that protestors can turn into an undifferentiated mob is captured 
in assertions that ‘dangerous anarchists’ may ‘masquerade’ as peaceful 
protestors and feeds into homogenising policing strategies that alienate 
protestors and help create the conditions for violence. It is these unchallenged 
assumptions, we contend, that meant that ‘the initial media perception of the 
police operation was predominantly positive’ (HMIC 2009: 65). But for the 
loss of life and the intervention of innumerable ‘citizen journalists’ (Porter 
2009) the matter may have rested there. 
 
Reflecting on alarmist stories during the build up to the 2005 G8 meeting in 
Gleneagles, one of Scotland’s more thoughtful columnists warned: 
 
Relentless forecasts of imminent violence tend to attract precisely the 
violent elements you don't want to come while deterring peaceful 
demonstrators. Lurid coverage is itself a threat to public order. 
Remember that if the bottles fly in July. (MacWhirter, 2005) 
 
It is worth recalling this now that the riot shields and batons have been 
wielded in anger too. Press coverage since the death of Ian Tomlinson has 
focussed more on policing than on protest. Indeed, reports into protests at 
Stonehenge (e.g. Morris 2009) and London’s Climate Camp in August 2009 
emphasised the need for a different style of policing. Channel 4’s Dispatches 
programme (see note 13) portrayed the policing at Climate Camp as informed 
by and in complete contrast to the G20 operation. There has also been 
extensive commentary on the HMIC report. The events of April 2009 have 
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received ongoing attention, not least in terms of official investigation into the 
actions of individual police officers (see, e.g., reports on the criminal charges 
laid against one officer in September 2009)15. ‘Traumatic events’ as della Porta 
notes, ‘can stimulate learning processes’ (in D. Waddington 2007: 32), and the 
police response to the Climate Camp on Blackheath in August 2009 suggested 
that lessons may well  have been learned.16 Whilst our focus in this paper in on 
the interplay between media coverage and policing rather than on the policing 
per se, several principles for protest policing arise from our analysis. Though 
they are already enshrined in the Association of Chief Police Officer’s  manual 
(Reicher 2009: 13) they are worth restating. 
 
Firstly, it is clear that treating all protesters as an undifferentiated mass is 
ineffective (it did not prevent the attack on the RBS for instance) and can 
escalate a situation. Police training and briefing could clearly do more to 
reinforce this point, and better communication during protests can help 
differentiate between protestors and explain what is happening. Finally, the 
events at the G20 demonstrate that a paramilitary police force is only as 
disciplined as its commanding officers. The failure of senior police officers to 
reign in or reprimand those lashing out at protestors and the assumptions 
articulated in the quotes above indicate the need for institutional reform 
rather than pinning the blame on a few bad apples. 
 
Whilst it is tempting to view the G20 as a landmark event that has changed 
the contours of protest policing and reportage, the media attention cycle is 
notoriously short. Once interest in the G20 fades, there is no guarantee 
against a return to earlier practices. In this context it will be interesting to 
chart the coverage accorded to future protests. Writing in the Guardian Porter 
(2009) notes the culpability of the media in foretelling violence and insists 
that ‘this predictive briefing must also end’. Following our analysis of G20 
coverage we would contend that it is not just the briefing that needs to end: it 
is the downplaying of police reassurances before an event and the privileging 
of official accounts in the aftermath; it is the search for violence even if none is 
apparent; it is in the inflation of internet murmurs into hard facts and in the 
resolute portrayal of ‘anarchists’ as violent, dangerous and out to cause chaos. 
It will mean focusing on banal facts over spectacular images or headlines. If 
we are not to see a repeat of the tragic events of 1 April 2009, it is not just the 
police who need to rethink their approach to protest, it is the media too.   
 
                                                          
1 See < http://www.putpeoplefirst.org.uk > 
2 (<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/xchange-international/>). Although aware of the problems in media 
indexing systems (cf. Earl et al 2004), LexisNexis allowed us to study a wider selection of newspapers 
than we would have otherwise been able to capture. 
3 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/G20/article5993139.ece 
4 See <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/G20/article6016126.ece> for footage and 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/g20-summit/5096877/G20-protests-Four-charged-
over-RBS-attack.html> for details on arrests and damage (Both Accessed 28 August 2009).. 
5 ‘Police clash with G20 protesters’ (Wednesday, 1 April 2009 23:53 UK), 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7977489.stm> (accessed 26 May 2009). 
6 Press release cited in full in the Guardian Online: ‘G20 fatality: How police view of Ian Tomlinson 
death changed’, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/08/ian-tomlinson-g20-death-official-police-
account> (accessed 26 May 2009) 
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7 See the Evening Standard’s report – the day after they warned that anarchists would ‘masquerade as 
peaceful demonstrators’ – of a ‘secret memo’ issued by British Transport Police. This urged railway 
staff “to report anarchists arriving in the capital by train … The memo suggests activists can be 
identified by their appearance – such as large numbers of people wearing similar coloured clothing or 
else carrying large banners …” (Davenport & Lefley, 2009) 
8 In March 2009 the University of East London suspended Professor Chris Knight, leading figure 
within Government of the Dead, after comments made on BBC radio – see ‘G20 protest professor 
suspended’, BBC News 26 March 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7967096.stm> , accessed, 27 
May 2009 
9 The current authors’ own direct experience of ‘kettling’ – in Edinburgh during the 2005 G8 protests – 
very closely matches the experiences described in the Guardian and the Times.  
10 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/video/2009/apr/07/g20-police-assault-video>  (7th April 2009)  
(accessed 03 July 2009) 
11 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/7989027.stm> (8th April 2009)  (accessed 03 July 2009)  
12 See, for instance, the coverage of policing at Kingsnorth power station which was only fully picked 
up after the G20 furore: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2009/jun/21/fit-watch-
kingsnorth-arrests>. See also the reports about attitudes towards protestors expressed on police blogs: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/26/g20-police-blog-assault> (Both accessed 07 July 2009). 
13 A Channel 4’s Dispatches programme on police public order training reinforced this view in 
illustrating how officers are prepared for the worst case scenario (‘Ready for a Riot’, broadcast 19 Oct 
ober 2009. See < http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/episode-guide/series-39/episode-
1> (Accessed 27 October 2009): 
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/episode-guide/series-39/episode-1 
14 A BBC report on this story notes that one officer is to be charged with assault whilst another remains 
suspended pending investigation: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8279001.stm> (Accessed 27 October 
2009) 
15 See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8279001.stm> (accessed 29 September 2009) 
16 See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/aug/27/climate-camp-environment-activists-
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